byspectra

margaretdickey/byspectra

I conducted a static analysis of DeepSeek, a Chinese LLM chatbot, using version 1.8.0 from the Google Play Store. The goal was to identify possible security and privacy problems.

I have actually blogged about DeepSeek previously here.

Additional security and archmageriseswiki.com personal privacy concerns about DeepSeek have been raised.

See also this analysis by NowSecure of the iPhone version of DeepSeek

The findings detailed in this report are based simply on fixed analysis. This suggests that while the code exists within the app, there is no definitive evidence that all of it is carried out in practice. Nonetheless, the presence of such code warrants examination, especially given the growing issues around information privacy, higgledy-piggledy.xyz surveillance, the potential abuse of AI-driven applications, securityholes.science and cyber-espionage dynamics between international powers.

Key Findings

Suspicious Data Handling & Exfiltration

- Hardcoded URLs direct information to external servers, raising issues about user activity tracking, such as to ByteDance "volce.com" endpoints. NowSecure recognizes these in the iPhone app the other day too.

Bespoke file encryption and information obfuscation methods are present, pipewiki.org with indications that they might be utilized to exfiltrate user details.
The app contains hard-coded public secrets, rather than relying on the user gadget's chain of trust.
UI interaction tracking catches detailed user behavior without clear permission.
WebView adjustment is present, which might permit the app to gain access to private external web browser information when links are opened. More details about WebView controls is here

Device Fingerprinting & Tracking

A considerable portion of the examined code appears to concentrate on event device-specific details, which can be used for tracking and fingerprinting.

- The app collects different special device identifiers, consisting of UDID, Android ID, IMEI, IMSI, and carrier details.
System homes, installed plans, and root detection mechanisms recommend potential anti-tampering measures. E.g. probes for the presence of Magisk, a tool that privacy supporters and security scientists use to root their Android devices.
Geolocation and network profiling exist, suggesting prospective tracking abilities and making it possible for or disabling of fingerprinting routines by area. - Hardcoded gadget design lists recommend the application might behave in a different way depending upon the detected hardware. - Multiple vendor-specific services are used to draw out extra gadget details. E.g. if it can not determine the gadget through basic Android SIM lookup (since approval was not approved), it tries manufacturer specific extensions to access the exact same details.

Potential Malware-Like Behavior

While no definitive conclusions can be drawn without vibrant analysis, numerous observed behaviors line up with recognized spyware and malware patterns:

- The app utilizes reflection and UI overlays, which could help with capture or phishing attacks.
SIM card details, serial numbers, and other device-specific data are aggregated for unknown functions.
The app executes country-based gain access to constraints and "risk-device" detection, recommending possible security mechanisms.
The app carries out calls to fill Dex modules, where additional code is loaded from files with a.so extension at runtime.
The.so submits themselves turn around and make additional calls to dlopen(), which can be used to fill additional.so files. This facility is not generally inspected by Google Play Protect and other static analysis services.
The.so files can be executed in native code, such as C++. Making use of native code adds a layer of intricacy to the analysis process and obscures the complete degree of the app's capabilities. Moreover, native code can be leveraged to more quickly escalate benefits, potentially making use of vulnerabilities within the os or gadget hardware.

Remarks

While data collection prevails in modern applications for debugging and improving user experience, aggressive fingerprinting raises considerable personal privacy concerns. The DeepSeek app needs users to visit with a valid email, wikitravel.org which need to currently offer enough authentication. There is no valid factor for photorum.eclat-mauve.fr the app to strongly gather and transmit unique device identifiers, IMEI numbers, SIM card details, and other non-resettable system residential or commercial properties.

The degree of tracking observed here exceeds typical analytics practices, possibly allowing relentless user tracking and re-identification throughout devices. These behaviors, integrated with obfuscation techniques and network communication with third-party tracking services, warrant a higher level of examination from security scientists and users alike.

The work of runtime code packing along with the bundling of native code suggests that the app might enable the deployment and execution of unreviewed, from another location delivered code. This is a major potential attack vector. No evidence in this report is provided that remotely deployed code execution is being done, only that the center for this appears present.

Additionally, the app's technique to detecting rooted gadgets appears excessive for an AI chatbot. Root detection is typically justified in DRM-protected streaming services, where security and akropolistravel.com content protection are critical, or in competitive video games to avoid unfaithful. However, there is no clear rationale for such stringent steps in an application of this nature, raising further concerns about its intent.

Users and organizations considering setting up DeepSeek must know these potential dangers. If this application is being utilized within an enterprise or government environment, additional vetting and security controls should be enforced before permitting its deployment on handled devices.

Disclaimer: The analysis provided in this report is based upon static code evaluation and does not indicate that all identified functions are actively used. Further examination is required for definitive conclusions.